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ARTICLES
The Instability of Freedom as
Noninterference: The Case of
Isaiah Berlin*
Philip Pettit
In Hobbes, freedom of choice requires nonfrustration: the option you prefer
must be accessible. In Berlin, it requires noninterference: every option, pre-
ferred or unpreferred, must be accessible—every door must be open. But
Berlin’s argument against Hobbes suggests a parallel argument that freedom
requires something stronger still: that each option be accessible and that no
one have the power to block access; the doors should be open, and there
should be no powerful doorkeepers. This is freedom as nondomination. The
claim is that freedom as noninterference is an unstable alternative between
freedom as nonfrustration and freedom as nondomination.
INTRODUCTION
Most theories of what makes people free in relation to the external
world treat the obstacles that derive from the ill will of others as the
primary restrictions on freedom; in other words, they equate external
with social freedom.1 Natural limitations reduce the range over which
you can enjoy your freedom from the will of others and may even be
instrumental in making you vulnerable to that will—and on those
* A version of this article was given as the Routledge Lecture in Philosophy at Cam-
bridge University, and as a presentation at the University of Paris V, in October 2009.
Other versions were presented at two conferences: one at the University of British Co-
lumbia, Vancouver, in October 2008, the other at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik, in
June 2010. I was greatly helped by comments received from members of the audience on
each occasion. I also benefited greatly from conversations on related matters with Selim
Berker and Sven Rosenkranz. And I was enormously helped in final revisions by comments
from John Christman, Rainer Forst, and the referees/editors.
1. Pace, e.g., Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995).
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grounds they will call for remedy. But according to these theories,
such limitations do not in themselves take away from your freedom;
they do not make you unfree in the way that other agents can do so.
Kant gives expression to an assumption they might unite in endorsing:
“Find himself in what condition he will, the human being is depen-
dent on many external things. . . . But what is harder and more un-
natural than this yoke of necessity is the subjection of one human
being under the will of another. No misfortune can be more terrifying
to one who is accustomed to freedom.”2
But notwithstanding the common assumption that freedom pri-
marily requires nonsubjection to the will of others, these theories of
external freedom divide sharply on what such nonsubjection means.
In terms explained later, some theories claim that freedom is reduced
when others frustrate you, some when others interfere with you, some
when others dominate you. In maintaining this line, they may focus
on the freedom of a particular choice or on the freedom of a person,
where people’s freedom as persons is usually identified with their free-
dom over a common range of important choices, on a common social
and legal basis. The issue between these different theories is of im-
mense importance in political theory, since the institutional require-
ments for promoting freedom as nonfrustration across a society are
weaker than the requirements for promoting freedom as noninterfer-
ence, and they in turn are weaker than the requirements for promot-
ing freedom as nondomination.3
The best-known adherent of the middle conception, freedom as
noninterference, is Isaiah Berlin, and I develop an argument for the
stronger conception of freedom as nondomination by way of inter-
rogating his work: in particular, his 1958 lecture on “Two Concepts of
Liberty” and some of his later commentary.4 I claim that while Berlin
introduced persuasive considerations against freedom as nonfrustra-
tion, these ought to have led him—and ought to lead us—not to rest
content with freedom as noninterference, but rather to go the full
distance and embrace a notion of freedom as nondomination. The
position he took up is an unstable halfway house between the other
two positions.
Although much has been written on Berlin’s conception of free-
2. Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 11.
3. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997).
4. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). This
contains Berlin’s 1958 lecture on “Two Concepts of Liberty” but also, especially in the
long introduction, a good deal of later commentary. In the text, I often distinguish between
references to the lecture itself and references to the commentary.
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dom as noninterference, few commentaries foreground his critique
of the weaker conception of freedom as nonfrustration. This weaker
conception is endorsed most clearly by Hobbes, though Berlin does
not seem to have recognized him as an antagonist.5 I present the
Hobbesian view in the first section of the essay and look at the way in
which Berlin breaks with it. Then, in the second section, I consider
Berlin’s argument for rejecting that view and adopting freedom as
noninterference. In the third section, I show how that argument sug-
gests a case for the more radical conception of freedom as nondom-
ination and demonstrate that the notion of freedom as noninterfer-
ence is unstable. And in the fourth section, I bolster the instability
claim by showing that the more radical conception also fits better with
Berlin’s views on what is required for the freedom of the person. In
a final, short conclusion, I speculate on why Berlin might have failed
to endorse the idea of freedom as nondomination.
The conception of freedom as nondomination counts as repub-
lican in the classical, neo-Roman sense of the term, according to many
recent accounts.6 Hobbes spent much of his work trying to displace
that view of freedom, of course, which he cast as an unfortunate legacy
of classical thought.7 Once we see the grounds of his opposition to
Hobbes’s central contentions, we can recognize in Berlin someone
who ought to have been deeply sympathetic to the republican tradi-
tion that Hobbes repudiated.
I. BERLIN’S BREAK WITH HOBBES
Freedom as Nonfrustration in Hobbes
The Hobbesian view of freedom—corporal freedom, to be exact8—is
summed up in the famous definition of a freeman in Leviathan: “a
free-man is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he
is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to.”9 Putting
aside the issue of how Hobbes understands hindrance, on which I
5. The thinker in whom Berlin finds the view he rejects is not Hobbes but John
Stuart Mill (ibid., 139). This is strange, as Hobbes quite clearly endorses the view, while
Mill is guilty, at most, of using a formulation that may seem to give it support: a formulation
that refers to being in a position to do what you actually want rather than to do whatever
you might come to want.
6. Pettit, Republicanism; Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998); Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill & Wang,
2002); John Maynor, Republicanism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).
7. Quentin Skinner, “Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power,” in Republicanism
and Political Theory, ed. C. Laborde and J. Maynor (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 83–102.
8. Philip Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind and Politics (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 8.
9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. E. Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), chap. 21.2.
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comment later, there are two surprising claims built into this defini-
tion.10 The first is that being externally hindered in the choice of a
given option takes from your freedom only if you have ‘a will to’ do
it; only if you prefer that option. And the second is that to be a
‘freeman’—to deserve to be accorded this status—is to escape all ex-
ternal hindrance in the options you prefer to take.
The first claim is surprising because it makes it too easy to be
free in a given choice: you are not made unfree by having an option
removed or replaced, if you happen not to want to enact it. The sec-
ond claim is surprising because, going to the other extreme, it makes
it impossibly hard to count as a freeman or free person. You must be
lucky enough, or perhaps powerful enough, for none of your choices
to be frustrated; it is not enough, for example, to escape frustration
in a designated range of choices.
While Berlin breaks with Hobbes on both of these claims, as we
shall see, I focus on his rejection of the first in this section. That first
claim is not just an implication of the definition that may have es-
caped Hobbes’s attention. It is a thesis that he emphasizes elsewhere
too. He does so most strikingly in a debate with Bishop Bramhall
about the preconditions for having a free choice between playing ten-
nis or not.
Bramhall suggests that if you are considering whether or not to
play tennis—we may assume a willing partner—and in the end you
decide against doing so, you may still have been wrong to think that
you had a free choice. After all, unbeknownst to you, someone may
have shut the door of the (“real”) tennis court against you. Hobbes
is undaunted by the claim, asserting that for anyone in your position,
“it is no impediment to him that the door is shut till he have a will
to play.”11 We may all agree that you freely decided against playing
tennis and that you might therefore be held responsible for this de-
10. I ignore questions raised by Hobbes’s assumption that freedom presupposes the
ability to take the options over which you are free: they must be within your “strength
and wit.” For the record, Berlin denies that freedom presupposes ability in this way, insisting
that you may be free to vote even when you are too ill to go to the polls: “Mere incapacity
to attain a goal is not lack of political liberty” (Four Essays on Liberty, 122). In fairness to
Berlin, he argued that in order to make liberty truly valuable, it might be necessary to
institute welfare measures for giving people abilities to match their political liberties. “What
is freedom to those who cannot make use of it? Without adequate conditions for the use
of freedom, what is the value of freedom?” (ibid., 124; see also lii). He is followed in this
view of what is required for the value as distinct from the nature of freedom by John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
11. Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall on Freedom and Necessity,
ed. Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 91.
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cision.12 But this is just to say that you made a decision on the false
assumption that you had a free choice, not that you actually had a
free choice. Hobbes, however, differs. He thinks that your freedom of
choice requires only that the option you prefer, and not necessarily
any other option, is available to you.
The Hobbesian view equates freedom with the nonfrustration of
your preference and your choice. You will not be frustrated if an
option you do not actually prefer—in this case, playing tennis—is
blocked; you will only be frustrated if the option you prefer is ob-
structed. And according to Hobbes you will enjoy freedom in any
choice in which you avoid such frustration.
Berlin’s Alternative
Berlin agrees with Hobbes that freedom of choice requires the ab-
sence of external hindrance, focusing—unlike Hobbes—on “the de-
liberate interference of other human beings.”13 They both hold that
the freedom with which they are concerned—in Hobbes’s explicit
reference, the freedom required for being a freeman—is jeopardized
by such intervention. But the issue for Berlin is whether Hobbes is
right that intervening to obstruct a nonpreferred option is irrelevant
to an agent’s freedom of choice. Suppose I am disposed to interfere,
not with the option you choose, but with an option that you might
have chosen to take and didn’t; suppose I am not disposed to frustrate
your preference but only to block an option you don’t actually prefer.
Does this take from the freedom of your choice or not?
In the opening part of his 1958 lecture, Berlin appears to go
along with the Hobbesian answer that no, it doesn’t. Thus, he explic-
itly endorses Hobbes’s definition, though without commenting on this
implication.14 He suggests that on “the ‘negative’ definition of liberty
in its classical form,” interference is “bad as such” because “it frus-
trates human desires.”15 And in later commentary, he describes his
12. Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Phi-
losophy 66 (1969): 829–39.
13. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 122. Given that Hobbes thinks that any form of
external hindrance takes from your freedom, he does not belong to the school of thought
described in the introduction. Casting him as a foil to Berlin, however, I concentrate only
on the hindrance imposed by other human beings; I treat him as if he did belong to that
school. Berlin defends his focus on the hindering effects of human action, quoting Rous-
seau’s claim that “the nature of things does not madden us, only ill will does” (ibid., 122).
The reference to ill will strongly suggests the need for intention—as other passages also
do—but Berlin goes on, confusingly, to say that when other human beings restrict us, this
action oppresses us, whether it is performed “with or without the intention of doing so.”
I take this to be just a slip.
14. Ibid., 123.
15. Ibid., 128.
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initial take on freedom in that lecture—“the formulation with which
I began”—as mistaking freedom for the absence of such frustration.16
But though his initial formulation of the notion of liberty may
have been Hobbesian in this way, he insists in this commentary that
the main arguments of the original lecture were not affected by this
“genuine error.” And that is certainly so, for he explicitly argues in
the course of the lecture that your negative liberty is not ensured by
being positioned to do what you actually want to do; you must be
positioned to do whatever you might happen to want or try to do
among the relevant alternatives.17 Freedom is not “the absence of ob-
stacles to the fulfillment of a man’s desires,” as he later puts it, but
“the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities.”18
In the later commentary, Berlin gives telling expression to his
non-Hobbesian point of view. The options in a choice are like doors
you can push on, he says. How extensive the choice is depends on
how many doors there are. How significant the choice is depends on
what the doors lead to. And, crucially, how free the exercise of choice
is depends on whether and how far the doors are open. “The extent
of a man’s negative freedom is, as it were, a function of what doors,
and how many are open to him; upon what prospects they are open;
and how open they are.”19
The important point in this metaphor is that the freedom of a
choice turns, not just on whether the door you push on is open, but
on whether all the doors are open, including those you might have
pushed on but didn’t. Interference may be the enemy of freedom,
but it is not just frustrating interference, as in Hobbes’s picture, which
matters: not just interference with the actual option preferred. The
fact that you would have suffered interference in the choice of an-
other option, even though you don’t suffer interference in the option
you adopt, will equally take from your freedom of choice. Freedom
16. Ibid., xxxviii.
17. Ibid., 139. Strictly, there is a problem in saying that to be free in the choice of
A, it must be the case that you could have chosen the alternative, B, had you wanted to
—had you preferred that option. This condition might be incapable of fulfillment because
you are the sort of person who would only want to do B if it was not available; the possibility
will be salient from Groucho Marx’s quip that he would only want to join a club that
would not accept him as a member. The problem can be overcome if what is required is
that you could have chosen B had you tried to do so, where it is not required in that
eventuality that you actually prefer B. For expressive convenience, I ignore this compli-
cation in the text. I am grateful to Lara Buchak for drawing the problem to my attention.
18. Ibid., xxxix.
19. Ibid., xlviii; see also xxxix. In the original lecture, he comes close to endorsing
the open-doors metaphor, despite his endorsement of Hobbes, when he denounces those
who would “block every door but one,” even one that opens on a “noble prospect” (127).
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as noninterference, as we can put his claim, requires more than free-
dom as nonfrustration.
When Hobbes speaks of the external hindrance that affects free-
dom, even that which originates in human beings, he only has in
mind the preventive sort of obstacle that removes one or more of the
agent’s options.20 When Berlin speaks of interference, he has a wider
category of intervention in mind, as have most philosophers who write
about social freedom. It includes not just removing an option but
replacing it by a penalized alternative, as in a coercive threat; and it
may include not just intervening in the options available but also un-
dermining the informed, deliberative character of the choice by de-
ception or manipulation.21
These different approaches suggest different readings of the
open-doors metaphor. On the Hobbesian story, a door will be open
just in case it is unlocked. On the story that Berlin proposes, a door
may be unlocked without strictly being open: to suggest analogues of
nonpreventive interference, it may be jammed, for example, or con-
cealed from view or misrepresented in a play of mirrors. We won’t
have much reason to return to this divergence but, for the record, I
shall have the wider conception of interference in mind when arguing
later about the radical implications of Berlin’s line of argument.
II. BERLIN’S ARGUMENT
No Freedom by Adaptation
Berlin does not rely on just the appeal of the open-doors metaphor
for undermining the view of freedom as nonfrustration. Nor does he
merely observe that on this view you may enjoy freedom in a choice
where you are left only one option, provided that is the option you
prefer. He offers an imaginative argument against that conception.22
This argument is of general interest and may represent Berlin’s most
lasting contribution to our thinking about freedom.
In full, perhaps pedantic dress, the argument goes like this:
1. Suppose with Hobbes that you enjoy freedom in a choice
20. This approach is adopted by Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994); Ian Carter, A Measure of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Matthew
H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
21. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 155. Although I shall speak in what follows of in-
terference without qualification, it might be more appropriate and even more faithful to
Berlin’s point of view—though not, as it happens, his precise formulations—to take him
to have only unlicensed interference in mind. Licensed or nonarbitrary interference, as
I think of it, materializes on terms laid down by the interferee, as in the example of how
his sailors treat Ulysses. See Philip Pettit, “Republican Liberty: Three Axioms, Four The-
orems,” in Laborde and Maynor, Republicanism and Political Theory.
22. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, xxxix.
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between A and B just in case you avoid interference in the
option that you actually choose; you avoid frustration.
2. By supposition, you do not enjoy freedom of choice in the
case where A attracts my interference, B does not, and you
choose A.
3. But, by supposition, you would enjoy freedom of choice in
that case, were you to choose B.
4. If you know the situation, therefore, it appears that you can
ensure your freedom of choice, without constraining my in-
terference, by adapting your preferences and choosing B.
5. But this is absurd. You cannot make yourself free just by ac-
commodating yourself to my disposition to interfere.
6. Thus, the original supposition that nonfrustration is enough
for freedom must be false.
The thrust of the argument is easily illustrated. Imagine that I
am a prisoner who, being forcibly imprisoned, does not have freedom
of choice as between staying behind bars and living in the outside
world. Do I lack freedom, as the conception of freedom as nonfrus-
tration implies, just because the option I prefer is living outside
prison? If so, then I can make myself free—I can give myself freedom
in the choice between living in prison or outside—just by adapting
my preferences and coming to want to stay in prison. As Berlin ex-
presses the thought in the original lecture, “I need only contract or
extinguish my wishes and I am made free.”23 Or, as he expands on
this later, “if to be free—negatively—is simply not to be prevented by
other persons from doing whatever one wishes, then one of the ways
of attaining such freedom is by extinguishing one’s wishes.”24
In the prison example, as in any examples that might be used to
illustrate Berlin’s lesson, the choice between living in prison and liv-
ing outside is taken as given, and the crucial observation is that adapt-
ing preferences in the face of obstruction to one or another option
cannot give you freedom in that choice. But it is worth noting that
there is a related context in which adaptation is not objectionable.
23. Ibid., 139.
24. Ibid., xxxviii. But see Carter, Measure of Freedom, and Kramer, Quality of Freedom.
They will argue that where adaptation is required for being able to take a particular
option—and also, to anticipate, where ingratiation is required for that result—the agent
loses out in overall freedom, not being in a position to choose the option-without-adap-
tation or the option-without-ingratiation. The observation may soften the difficulty of living
with the conclusion of Berlin’s argument—that one can make oneself free in a given
choice by adaptation or ingratiation—but it does not remove it; the intuition remains that
one cannot achieve freedom in that given choice just by adapting preferences or just by
ingratiating yourself with an obstructive agent. For a general comment on the limitations
of this overall-freedom line, see Pettit, “Republican Liberty.”
Pettit Instability of Freedom as Noninterference 701
Suppose you want to spend time with me on the weekends but do not
share my preference for hiking. You might reasonably work at getting
yourself to like hiking in order to make yourself into an acceptable
weekend companion. And having won me around, your preference-
adaptation would then have given you a choice on one or another
weekend between going hiking with me or staying at home. This sort
of adaptation is designed to give you more options and more choices
by making me into a willing partner in certain joint activities. It is not
designed, like the adaptation Berlin addresses, to make you free in a
choice between given options.
Freedom and Preference-Satisfaction
The counterintuitive consequence that undermines the Hobbesian
view is avoidable under the open-doors claim that every option in a
free choice must escape interference. And that becomes Berlin’s main
argument for the claim. The significance of the claim shows up in the
fact, emphasized in the work of Amartya Sen, that the ideal of free-
dom is distinct from that of preference-satisfaction—that is, the sat-
isfaction of unadapted preferences.25 The ideal of preference-satisfac-
tion requires only that actual interference and actual frustration of
preference be avoided. The ideal of freedom of choice requires the
avoidance of counterfactual interference too. Berlin marks the con-
trast between the ideals nicely: “to teach a man that, if he cannot get
what he wants, he must learn to want only what he can get may con-
tribute to his happiness or his security; but it will not increase his civil
or political freedom.”26
Berlin’s open-doors view implies that freedom has a modal char-
acter. You are free in a choice not just in virtue of enjoying nonin-
terference in the actual world where you choose A but in virtue also
of enjoying it in a range of possible worlds: presumptively, the nearest
possible world or worlds in which you choose B.27 You are free in the
25. See Philip Pettit, “Capability and Freedom: A Defence of Sen,” Economics and
Philosophy 17 (2001): 1–20.
26. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, xxxix.
27. It may be enough, according to Berlin, that you enjoy noninterference in the
nearest possible world or worlds in which you choose the other option, B. Or it may be
required that there is a larger range of possible Y-worlds where noninterference is absent.
These might be defined in a context-sensitive way but certainly cannot include all possible
worlds in which you choose B. The fact that you would attract interference in the remote
possible world where B would bring about the end of all sentient life, e.g., hardly shows
that you are actually unfree in choosing between A and B. I abstract from this issue here,
as I abstract from the related issue of whether it is necessary, not just that you are actually
not interfered with in choosing A, but that you would not be interfered with in a range
of other possible A-worlds: worlds that differ in intuitively irrelevant ways from the actual
world. On issues about the relation between noninterference and freedom and about how
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actual world not just in virtue of its being a world without interference
but also in virtue of its being a world where certain features mean
that you would not suffer interference even if you chose other than
you actually did.
Berlin’s argument shows quite effectively that freedom of choice
is a distinct goal from actual preference-satisfaction and, assuming it
is desirable, a distinct ideal. He makes the a priori assumption—an
assumption expressive of how we conceptualize freedom—that you
cannot make yourself free by accommodating yourself to restrictive
constraints, only by challenging them. And then he shows that if we
are to be faithful to this assumption in looking after your freedom, we
must try to ensure that the doors associated with your different options
are all open. We cannot settle for the more parsimonious strategy of
worrying about keeping an option open only to the extent that it is
likely you will choose it. That would be to worry about promoting your
preference-satisfaction, not strictly your freedom of choice.28
There are some situations, of course, where we should settle for
the more parsimonious ideal. It may be that we cannot protect your
access to both options A and B—at least not at a reasonable cost—
and so that we cannot ensure your freedom of choice as between
those options. In that situation, it would certainly make sense to invest
our resources in protection of each option in a measure that corre-
sponds to the likelihood of your choosing it. In other words, it would
make sense, given the infeasibility of ensuring freedom of choice, to
settle for promoting expected preference-satisfaction.29 But the fact
that second-best circumstances might force this strategy on us does
not mean that there is reason in general to prioritize preference-
satisfaction over freedom of choice or to treat the two goals as equiv-
alent. Berlin’s message remains in place.
The Importance of the Message
The importance of the message shows up in the fact that the Hobbes-
ian error against which he guards continues to appear in contempo-
robust noninterference must be in order to constitute freedom, see Pettit, “Capability and
Freedom”; and Christian List, “The Impossibility of a Paretian Republican? Some Com-
ments on Pettit and Sen,” Economics and Philosophy 20 (2004): 1–23, and “Republican
Freedom and the Rule of Law,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2006): 201–20. These
issues are parallel to issues in epistemology about the relation between true belief and
knowledge. See, e.g., Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2000).
28. That the ideals are distinct does not rule out the possibility, however, that inter-
ference-with-frustration is worse, worse even in freedom terms, that interference-without-
frustration.
29. Jeremy Waldron, “Pettit’s Molecule,” in Common Minds: Themes from the Philosophy
of Philip Pettit, ed. G. Brennan, R. E. Goodin, F. Jackson, and M. Smith (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 143–60. But see also the previous footnote.
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rary writing. In a recent paper, Robert Goodin and Frank Jackson
hold that a concern for freedom—negative freedom, as they suggest
—rationally requires the maximization of expected noninterference.30
This claim fits with the Hobbesian point of view and is deeply opposed
to Berlin’s own line.31
To maximize expected noninterference is to minimize expected
interference. And two probabilities are relevant to that goal. First, the
hypothetical probability that someone will interfere with your choice,
should you take an option, x; this probability can be represented as
P(Int if x).32 And second, the absolute probability of your taking that
option: in the usual formulation, P(x). In a choice between A and B,
then, you will increase expected noninterference—you will reduce
expected interference—to the extent that you can reduce this sum:
P(A)P(Int if A)  P(B)P(Int if B).
This puts us in a position to see why the Goodin-Jackson line is
inconsistent with Berlin’s central thesis. If you can rationally serve the
cause of your own freedom by reducing this sum in any way possible,
as they suggest, then you can rationally serve the cause of your free-
dom by choosing the option for which the corresponding hypotheti-
cal probability is lower. Thus, you can promote your own freedom of
choice as between A and B, by adapting preference so as to select the
option that has the lesser chance of triggering interference. If B is
likely to attract interference, and A is not, you can make yourself free
by coming to want and choose A, setting P(B) at zero. The approach
is directly in conflict with Berlin’s anti-Hobbesian message.
It may be helpful, using this probabilistic language, to set out
schematically the contrast between the positions that Hobbesians and
Berlinians adopt.
Others can and will: interfere if you choose A
(Int if A)
interfere if you choose B
(Int if B)
You actually 1. choose A 2. choose A
You actually 3. choose B 4. choose B
30. Robert E. Goodin and Frank Jackson, “Freedom from Fear,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 35 (2007): 249–65.
31. Philip Pettit, “Freedom and Probability: A Comment on Goodin and Jackson,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (2008): 206–20.
32. The hypothetical probability P(Int if x) should be understood, not as a conditional
probability, but in one of the alternative modes consistent with causal decision theory:
e.g., as the probability of the truth of the appropriate subjunctive conditional. See James
M. Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999). The conditional probability P(Int/x)—the probability of interference, given x—
may be low for evidential rather than objective or causal reasons: say, because your taking
x would be good evidence that I am friendly and unlikely to interfere.
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Hobbesians think that you are free if 2 or 3 obtains. Berlinians
think that no interference must occur. They argue that whether you
choose A or B, the freedom of the choice requires that P(Int if A)
and P(Int if B) should each be suitably low.
III. BUILDING ON BERLIN’S ARGUMENT
No Freedom by Ingratiation
Berlin argues that it is necessary for the freedom of a choice, say
between options A and B, that each option should remain accessible,
each door open. But is this sufficient for the freedom of the choice?
That is the question that I want to raise in this section. I try to show
that an argument that parallels Berlin’s own argument against Hobbes
suggests that it is not sufficient. As he argues for freedom as nonin-
terference over freedom as nonfrustration, so it is possible in parallel
to argue for freedom as nondomination over freedom as noninter-
ference.
Berlin’s argument starts from the assumption that you cannot
make yourself free by adapting your preferences to the constraints of
another’s interference and uses this in a reductio ad absurdum of the
Hobbesian theory of freedom. The argument is that if the Hobbesian
theory is true, then it follows, absurdly, that you can make yourself
free by a suitable form of preference-adaptation. It turns out, however,
that there is a similar sort of absurdity that follows if Berlin’s own
theory is true, so that his position is exposed to a parallel reductio.
This is how the argument goes.
1. Suppose with Berlin that you enjoy freedom in a choice be-
tween A and B just in case both options are open; you avoid
interference in each option, not just interference in the op-
tion preferred.
2. By supposition, you do not enjoy freedom of choice in the
case where I have a power of interference and, being ill
willed, am disposed to interfere with one or the other option.
3. But, by supposition, you would enjoy freedom of choice in
that case if I were disposed, notwithstanding my power, to
interfere with neither.
4. If you know the situation, then, it appears that you can make
yourself free, without reducing my power of interference, just
by ingratiating yourself with me and getting me to let you
have your way.
5. But this is absurd. You cannot make yourself free just by ac-
commodating yourself to my power of interference.
6. Thus, the original supposition that noninterference is enough
for freedom must be false.
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Berlin’s argument against Hobbes turns on the intuition that
adapting your preferences so as to choose things that are accessible
cannot make you free, even if it can increase your comfort or con-
tentment. This argument against Berlin turns on the intuition that,
equally, adapting your attitudes so as to ingratiate yourself with me
—or with any power in your life—cannot make you free, even if again
it can make life more comfortable. You cannot make yourself free, so
the idea goes, by cozying up to the powerful and keeping them sweet.
That sort of deference—that sort of toadying, fawning, or kowtowing,
to use some established terms of derogation—testifies to the unfree-
dom of your situation; it is not a strategy whereby you might overcome
it. As freedom cannot be won by adaptation, so it cannot be won by
ingratiation.
The Anti-ingratiation Assumption
Berlin’s theory of freedom as noninterference entails that ingratiation
is a possible means of liberation in the same way that Hobbes’s theory
of freedom as nonfrustration entails that adaptation is a possible
means of liberation. And this entailment argues against the Berlinian
theory, as the corresponding entailment argues against the Hobbes-
ian. Let the antiadaptation assumption be granted and Hobbes’s the-
ory must fail; let the anti-ingratiation assumption be granted and Ber-
lin’s must fail. The problem is not that adaptation or ingratiation in
the relevant contexts is intuitively objectionable, as it surely is, or even
that it will occur very often, which it may not do. The problem, rather,
is that neither adaptation nor ingratiation counts as a possible means
of liberation, and any theory that entails that it can serve a liberating
role has to be inadequate.
Where the antiadaptation assumption is that all the options in a
free choice must be open, the anti-ingratiation claim is that not any
old way of opening them will do. You may be free in a choice between
A and B insofar as the accessibility of those options derives from nat-
ural obstacles to my interference—or anyone else’s—or from other
agencies that protect you from my interference, or from your power
of retaliating against my interference, or from the fact that such in-
terference will have various social or even psychological costs. But the
anti-ingratiation assumption is that you will certainly not be free if it
remains just a matter of will or taste or favor, as it will remain in the
wake of the most successful ingratiation, that I leave the options open
and up to you.33
33. What if you were close to certain that I would not be put off by any line you took
in the choice between A and B, or in any other choice of that kind? What if you were so
sure of my favorable attitude toward you that you had no fear of alienating me and
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The point is not that it would be a solecism to say that you were
free to take either option in such a case—in suitable contexts, it
would be perfectly good English to say this—but rather that the sort
of latitude enjoyed does not rule out subjection to my will and does
not live up to the more demanding connotations of freedom. In par-
ticular, it does not live up to the connotation whereby you are free
in a given choice only to the extent that you are not subject to the
will of another as to how you should choose. According to Berlin,
you will be subject to my will in a choice between A and B just in
the event of my deliberately interfering—presumably without your
license—with the option you actually choose, A, or with the option
you might have chosen, B. But you will also be subject to my will if it
is a mere artifact of taste or inclination, not the product of any con-
straint, that I am happy for you to choose as you wish between A and
B. When I grant you the favor of choosing as you wish, it remains the
case that should my will change, then I will interfere with one or the
other option. You depend on my will remaining the favorable way it
is, therefore, for having the choice between A and B. You have an
open choice between those options only because it is my will that you
should have that choice.
In discussing adaptation, I mentioned that while it is not a pos-
sible means of liberation in a choice between given options, there is
a related sort of context where it may serve a useful role. In the il-
lustration given, you might work on your preferences in order to in-
duce an attachment to hiking and make yourself into an acceptable
weekend companion of mine. And you might thereby give yourself a
choice on one or another weekend between going hiking with me or
staying at home. As this is true for adaptation, so it is clearly true for
ingratiation; you might also make yourself into an acceptable week-
end companion by using your charms and wiles to win me over. Ad-
aptation and ingratiation may be sensible ways of making me or any
other person willing to participate in some joint activity, and they can
serve in this role to give you more options and more choices. But that
is entirely consistent with the claim that in a choice between given
triggering interference? Would there still be a sense in which your choice was subject to
my will? The right response to this query is that you could not think of me as such a
mechanically predetermined entity—and certainly could not manifest that view—while
continuing to see and treat me as an agent. Suppose that you are disposed to hold me
responsible as an agent for whatever I turn out to do in a given choice that affects your
interests, so that you will feel gratitude or resentment at the decision I take. You must
then think of me, before the decision is made, as being in a position to take one or
another course, depending on my will. And that attitude rules out the sort of certainty
envisaged here. For such a viewpoint, see the work of a contemporary and colleague of
Berlin’s: Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1962).
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options, neither initiative counts as a possible means of liberation: a
way of giving yourself freedom in that very choice.
Freedom as Nondomination
The upshot of this discussion is that insofar as I have the resources
to interfere without cost in a choice of yours—insofar as I have the
power and knowledge required—your ability to make the choice is
dependent on my will as to what you should do, and you are in that
sense subject to my will. To the extent that I have a power of inter-
fering without cost in your choice, I count as dominating you; I am
in a position associated iconically with a master or dominus.34 And so
the endorsement of the anti-ingratiation assumption, and of the ar-
gument in which it figures, leads to replacing the conception of free-
dom as noninterference with the conception of freedom as nondom-
ination. The price that has to be paid for denying that ingratiation is
a possible means of liberation is to take freedom to require nondom-
ination.35
Domination is a pervasive phenomenon and to hold that freedom
rules it out is to make freedom into quite a demanding ideal. The
domination whereby I take away your freedom in a choice between A
and B may not manifest itself in my frustrating that choice or even
in my interfering in the choice without frustrating it: that is, in inter-
fering with a nonpreferred option. It may just consist in my having
the power to interfere more or less without cost, should my will in-
cline that way.36 And it may consist in the possession of such power,
34. Pettit, Republicanism, chap. 2.
35. Inevitably, this presentation of freedom as nondomination is not as cautious as
it might be. Two points of caution, in particular, should be registered. One is that you do
not depend on the will of another in the relevant sense just in virtue of your options
being dependent on what they, perhaps in ignorance of your existence, choose to do; in
that case, you do not depend on their will as to what you should do: they may have no
wishes about what you should do. And another is that you do not depend on the will of
others just in virtue of the fact that a majority in your society might coalesce and take
against you; short of coalescing or incorporating, they do not constitute an existent agency
that dominates you, and the possibility of such a development testifies only to possible,
not actual, domination.
36. Indeed, the varieties of domination are even richer than this suggests. I may
interfere with you, as explained earlier, by removing or replacing an option, by denying
you information about the options, or by undermining your capacity to reason properly
about them. But this means that I may have the power to interfere with you in a given
choice, should my will incline that way—i.e., I may dominate you—not just in virtue of
superior resources, intuitively understood, but even in virtue of your believing that I have
such resources. If you do believe that I have those resources, then I will have the power
to deceive you in the choice: say, by making a bluff threat to stop you doing one or another
option. All of this illustrates Hobbes’s remark that “reputation of power is power.” See
Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 10.5.
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even when domination is the last thing I seek. If the power of inter-
ference is one that I cannot abjure or contain—if I enjoy it, for ex-
ample, by grace of the superior legal standing that husbands used to
have over wives, masters over servants—then I cannot unmake the
fact that whether or not you are to suffer my interference depends
on the state of my will. It is the existence of my power of relatively
costless interference, not its exercise—not even its exercise against a
nonpreferred option—that makes you unfree. The ideal of freedom
as nondomination would argue, then, for quite dramatic limitations
on the power that one person or group of persons may have of im-
posing their will on another.
This ideal has deep roots in the history of thought. There is a long
tradition of thinking that if the options in a choice are open only by
virtue of the goodwill of the powerful, then the agent is not free in
making that choice. The tradition goes back to at least the Roman
republican way of thinking about freedom, and it survived through the
Renaissance and the English republic—Hobbes notwithstanding—to
become a centerpiece of political thought in the eighteenth century.
You are not free in any choice, to quote the eighteenth-century re-
publican Richard Price, if your access to the options depends on an
“indulgence” on my part, or an “accidental mildness.”37 Freedom, as
Algernon Sidney had put it in the 1680, is “independency upon the
will of another.”38 In the words of Cato’s Letters, a popular tract of the
eighteenth century, “Liberty is, to live upon one’s own terms; slavery
is, to live at the mere mercy of another.”39
Modeling and Illustrating This Freedom
The republican idea is made vivid in the traditional image of the free
horse. Does the horse that is given free or loose rein enjoy freedom
of choice in virtue of the implied permission to go in this direction
or that? It may do so if freedom requires merely that the relevant
options be open; after all, the horse can go in any direction it likes.
But it will not enjoy freedom of choice, if the accessibility of the op-
tions cannot depend on the will of another. For whether the horse
can go in one direction or another depends on the will of the rider.
As republicans see it, the horse will be unfree just in virtue of having
someone in the saddle; free rein is not enough for free choice.
But the republican idea can also be expressed with the help of
37. Richard Price, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
26.
38. Algernon Sidney, Discourses concerning Government (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics,
1990), 17.
39. John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters (New York: Da Capo, 1971),
2:249–50.
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the open-doors metaphor on which Berlin relies. Are you free just
insofar as both doors are open in the choice between A and B? Not
necessarily. What freedom ideally requires in the republican book is
not just that the doors be open but that there be no doorkeeper who
can close a door—or jam it, or conceal it—more or less without cost;
there is no doorkeeper on whose goodwill you depend for one or
another of the doors remaining open. If I am in the position of such
a doorkeeper, therefore, your access to the A and B options is not
supported in the manner that freedom of choice strictly requires.
As the plausibility of the antiadaptation assumption argues that
all the doors in a free choice must be open, so the plausibility of the
anti-ingratiation assumption argues that there must be no depen-
dence on the good graces of a doorkeeper. When you ingratiate your-
self with me and I let you go by a door that I would otherwise have
closed, you do not cease to be subject to my will. You have not escaped
the constraint that made you unfree in the first place, nor done any-
thing to reduce the effectiveness of the constraint, say by raising the
assured or expected costs, physical or psychological, of my acting
against you. While continuing to operate under the yoke of my will,
you have merely adjusted so as to make your life more comfortable.
You have done exactly the sort of thing that the prisoner does in
adjusting to life behind bars.
Where the image of the prisoner illustrates the illusion of free-
dom by adaptation, there are many images available to illustrate the
illusion of freedom by ingratiation. One of the most vivid is presented
in Mary Wollstonecraft’s description of the subjection of women in
her time.40 The woman who lives under the will of a husband may
rely on mincing steps and beguiling smiles to keep her husband sweet
and to get her way in a variety of choice. But she doesn’t succeed
thereby in getting out from under his will, escaping the constraint
that it represents. She may delude herself that she is free in those
choices, as the adaptive prisoner may delude himself about his free-
dom, but no one should be deceived. Certainly Wollstonecraft is quite
clear. However kindly or gullible, however much he is a pushover, the
husband remains a master. And to live under the will or power of a
master—to live in potestate domini—is not to be free.
Modal Robustness
The lesson can be formulated with the help of the probabilistic lan-
guage employed earlier. On the Hobbesian approach, you can make
yourself free in a choice between A and B—you can reduce the sum,
40. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women (New York: Whitston,
1982).
710 Ethics July 2011
P(A)P(Int if A)  P(B)P(Int if B)—by setting either P(A) or P(B) to
zero, that is, by adapting so as to choose the option with the lesser
prospect of interference on my part or on the part of any other. On
the Berlinian approach, you cannot give yourself freedom in the A-B
choice by means of self-censorship, but you can do so, aiming at the
reduction of the same sum, by ingratiating yourself with me and other
relevant powers in the hope of lowering P(Int if A), P(Int if B), or
both.
The Berlinian revision of Hobbes requires that interference
should remain improbable—ideally, absent—whether you choose A
or choose B; things must be such that the prospect of interference is
low in both possible worlds, so that noninterference is modally robust.
The republican revision of Berlin requires that this should indeed be
so but in a way that is independent of my goodwill or that of others.
P(Int if A) and P(Int if B) have to remain low, whether I and other
powers in your life are friendly or hostile, so that noninterference
becomes more robust still. Writing “F” for friendly and “H” for hostile,
there are four possible ways the world may be, and in each scenario,
the probability of interference has to be low. It must be low in the
presence of A and F: that is, when you choose A and we others are
friendly. And it must also be low in the presence of A and H, B and
F, and B and H. You must enjoy such protection or empowerment in
the actual world that interference is unlikely under each of those
scenarios.41
The considerations rehearsed show, I believe, that as we should
be moved by Berlin’s argument against Hobbes on free choice—
against the conception of freedom as nonfrustration—so we should
be moved by analogous arguments against the conception of freedom
as noninterference. We should embrace the idea that a choice is free
to the extent that it is not made under conditions of dependency on
41. Imagine, then, that you face a choice between options A and B. By Berlin’s lights
it must be the case that you avoid interference both in the A-scenario—the world where
you choose A—and in the B-scenario. By republican lights, you should avoid interference
in the corresponding four scenarios, described as A-F, A-H, B-F, and B-H. But this de-
scription of the positions raises a natural question parallel to one raised in an earlier
footnote on Berlin. How encompassing should the A-F scenario be—and the A-H, B-F,
and B-H scenarios? At a minimum, it might reduce to a singleton—the nearest possible
world, as we say, in which A-F holds; and I have written, implicitly, as if this is the way to
think: it fits with the standard reading of the counterfactual conditional. At a maximum,
it might encompass all those possible worlds where A-F holds true, including outlandishly
unlikely worlds where, say, a more powerful, extragalactic species invades earth. On the
most plausible understanding, however, it should probably be taken to refer us to a range
of possible worlds, salient on the basis of a background, contextually sensitive understand-
ing, where you choose A and others are friendly. I cannot discuss the question further in
this context.
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the goodwill of others and so not in the presence of a power of in-
terference on the part of others. The un–freedom of choice suffered
as a result of domination may be made worse if there is interference
or frustration as well. But if it is to be replaced by freedom, then it
is essential that there be no domination; the absence of frustration
and interference is not enough on its own to guarantee that result.
IV. FREEDOM OF THE PERSON
Berlin’s View of the Free Person
For all that has been said so far, Berlin might go along with the spirit
of Hobbes’s view on what it is to be a ‘freeman’ or free person. He
might say that you are a free person only if you enjoy freedom in all
your choices: among the things that you have the ability to do—per-
haps on your own, perhaps in the presence of willing partners—you
do not suffer the interference of others. Or he might go along with
a modified version of that ideal according to which you are a free
person to the extent that you are not interfered with; you enjoy such
freedom in greater measure, the greater the range of choices in which
you are free.
Berlin does neither of these things, however. Without comment-
ing explicitly on the relationship between the ideal of having a free
choice and the ideal of being a free person, he makes absolutely clear
that on this matter too his view is very different from the Hobbesian
one. In later commentary on his 1958 lecture, he says that to be
free—in effect, to be a free person—is “to be accorded an area . . .
in which one is one’s own master”; it is to enjoy a domain where one
“is not obliged to account for his activities to any man so far as this
is compatible with the existence of organized society.”42 As he put it
in the lecture itself, it is to have access to “a certain minimum area
of personal freedom which must on no account be violated.”43
A Republican View
It is no accident that Hobbes made it so hard for someone to count
as a freeman, taking it to require the enjoyment of freedom across
the full gamut of choice, and that he thereby marginalized the ideal.
He would have relished that marginalization, since the republican way
of thinking made the freedom of the person or citizen central to
42. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, lx.
43. Ibid., 123. I abstract from the question of whether, according to Berlin, estab-
lishing this minimal area, and thereby enabling each person to be free, also requires
providing for the value of that freedom in the sense discussed in an earlier footnote: i.e.,
also requires giving people the wherewithal to enjoy the exercise of choice in that area.
I assume that at least an updated version of the republican ideal of the free person,
mentioned later in this section, would require such support.
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political thought. In Roman thinking, to be a free person just was to
be a citizen incorporated in the matrix of protection for certain basic
choices that is afforded to each—in theory, afforded equally to each
—by the rule of law. Under this approach, as one commentator puts
it, “full libertas is coterminous with civitas”;44 being a free person
means nothing more or less than being a citizen. By making the cat-
egory of the freeman or liber impossible of realization, Hobbes chal-
lenged a foundational concept in the ideology of his main opposition.
He struck out against those in Parliament and elsewhere who took
the freedom of the freeman to be a status that all citizens ought to
be able to enjoy.45
Without connecting with the debate between Hobbes and the
parliamentarians, Berlin shows that on this issue he is clearly on the
republican side. He is with that tradition in recognizing that it is legal
conventions, not metaphysical rights, that determine the range of
choices in which people are to be equally protected; the “area of
men’s free action must be limited by law,”46 he says, and has to be
“artificially carved out, if need be.”47 And he is also on the republican
side in holding that not any old way of demarcating the area is sat-
isfactory. The “field of free choice”—the range of choices or liberties
that are to be protected48—should be available equally to each, and
it should be as large as possible consistently with “the existence of
organized society.”49 Society should provide for each “a maximum de-
gree of noninterference compatible with the minimum demands of
social life.”50
While the field of free choice envisaged by Berlin clearly includes
the traditional liberties in the domain of thought, speech, association,
location, occupation, ownership, and the like, these comments show
that he thinks of them as liberties established and variously inter-
preted in the conventions and laws of particular societies. As in the
republican tradition, he sees them as institutional artifacts, the legacy
of a cultural and legal heritage, not as god-given, natural rights. They
are the product of what he sees as “rules so long and widely accepted
44. Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Ideal at Rome during the Late Republic and Early
Principate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 3.
45. Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
46. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 123.
47. Ibid., lx.
48. Philip Pettit, “The Basic Liberties,” in Essays on H. L. A. Hart, ed. M. Kramer
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 201–24.
49. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, lxi.
50. Ibid., 161; see also lxii.
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that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it
is to be a normal human being.”51
Berlin associates the ideal of living in a society that enables you
to be your own master, and that extends this possibility to everyone,
with “the fathers of liberalism—Mill and Constant,” but it clearly con-
forms closely to earlier republican thinking.52 The guiding insight is
that “to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is an inalienable
ingredient in what makes human beings human.”53 That insight at-
tracted special emphasis and accrued novel connotations in the lib-
eral writers to whom Berlin refers, but it is already present in the
republican image of the agents who live, as Sidney put it, “in inde-
pendency upon the will of another”: the citizens, in the phrase from
Roman law, who live sui juris, on their own terms.
A View That Requires Nondomination
But not only does Berlin rejoin the older tradition in his particular
ideal of freedom in the person. What I now wish to point out is that
he cannot really secure this ideal, while holding that the freedom it
requires in designated choices is freedom as noninterference. Were
the free person to be provided only with freedom as noninterference
in the “field of free choice,” then that provision would not ensure
that it is an area “in which one is one’s own master.” If I am to be
free in this sense, as Berlin puts it at one point, there must be “room
within which I am legally accountable to no one for my movements.”54
But I will certainly be accountable to others if I have to depend on
their goodwill for the capacity to make a choice in favor of one option
or another within the designated domain. I may not be legally or
morally obliged to those others, but I will be obliged in the more
basic currency of prudence; I will be obliged to stay in the good books
of those others, on pain of a setback to my interests. Enjoying free-
dom as noninterference in that domain is consistent, as we know, with
such dependence. And so the freedom required in Berlin’s ideal of
the free person has to be more demanding: it has to amount to some-
thing close to freedom as nondomination.
How might a society seek to promote freedom as noninterference
among its members, without giving them freedom as nondomination?
A legal regime that gave the relatively powerful rewards for not in-
terfering with the relatively powerless—perhaps rewards artificially
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beneficiaries—might fit the bill. It might do better by maximizing
noninterference overall—in particular, noninterference in the do-
main of basic choice—than a regime that established defenses or de-
terrents for the protection of the weak. And so, for all that freedom
as noninterference requires, such a regime would be a more attractive
prospect.
Another regime that might do quite well by the maximization of
freedom as noninterference, yet jeopardize freedom as nondomina-
tion, is the benevolent dictatorship. This would give supreme, un-
challengeable power to one wholly virtuous individual or body. Being
benevolent, that dictator would not perpetrate any undue interfer-
ence against the citizens of the society. And being benevolent, the
dictator would at the same time prevent citizens from interfering with
one another. This dictatorship too might do much better by way of
promoting noninterference than any system of democratically estab-
lished defenses and deterrents.55
Berlin would have found both of these regimes objectionable and
repugnant on grounds of freedom alone. For under either regime it
would clearly be the case that many people were obliged and account-
able to others, being dependent on their continuing goodwill for the
enjoyment of noninterference, even noninterference in the suppos-
edly entrenched field of free choice. We saw earlier that his argument
against freedom as nonfrustration and in favor of freedom as nonin-
terference suggests grounds for going further still and thinking of
freedom of choice as requiring nondomination. We now see that his
ideal of the free person points in the same direction. That ideal re-
quires this more radical form of freedom in the choices that are so-
cially privileged—the basic liberties—and not merely freedom as non-
interference.
CONCLUSION
Why does Berlin miss the republican direction in which many of his
insights ought to have led him? The question becomes particularly
telling, in view of the fact that by 1969 he had begun to articulate his
image of the free person in terms that have republican connotations.
“Freedom, at least in its political sense, is co-terminous,” he says, “with
the absence of bullying or domination.”56
The answer to the question, I think, is that his history of freedom
let him down. The negative conception of freedom as noninterfer-
55. Perhaps this is what Berlin himself registered in saying that the “connection
between democracy and individual liberty is a good deal more tenuous than it seemed to
many advocates of both” (ibid., 130–31).
56. Ibid., lvi.
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ence, though not always distinguished from nonfrustration, was the
familiar ideal of classical liberal and utilitarian thought; Bentham,
who took himself to be its inventor, described it as the “cornerstone”
of his system.57 Berlin identified with this tradition of thought, even
as his anti-Hobbesian argument should have pushed him away. And
he did so, I suspect, because of thinking that the only alternative was
the positive conception of freedom, institutionally interpreted. Under
this conception, your social or political freedom does not just rely on
law—and perhaps, as republicanism would require, a democratic,
nondominating law58—for its realization. It consists in being the en-
franchised member of a self-determining collectivity such that its will
is a will in which you partake. Where the negative conception looked
like the modern way of thinking about freedom, this was cast as the
unique premodern alternative: the ancient conception of freedom, as
Benjamin Constant had described it in 1819.59
Far from being the only premodern alternative, this positive con-
ception was the form that the republican conception took in the wake
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s reconstrual of republican ideas.60 Rous-
seau himself adopted the conception of freedom as nondomination
—nondependency on the will of another—in line with the Italian-
Atlantic tradition of republican thought: the tradition that originated
in Rome, matured in Renaissance Italy, and became popularized in
the eighteenth-century English-speaking world.61 But he rejected the
traditional republican belief that only a mixed, contestatory consti-
tution could further the cause of such freedom. Instead, he followed
Bodin and Hobbes in arguing that the state had to be ruled by a
unified sovereign and so, in the republic, by a unified assembly of
citizens. Thus, he generated a new form of republicanism in which
the citizens are lawmakers, and their freedom or nondomination is
guaranteed by the fact that they live under laws of their own, collec-
tive making: they live under the shared general will. As this new re-
publicanism took root, it gave rise to the idea that not only was free-
57. Douglas C. Long, Bentham on Liberty (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977),
54.
58. Philip Pettit, “Law and Liberty,” in Law and Republicanism, ed. S. Besson and J. L.
Marti (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39–59.
59. Benjamin Constant, Constant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988).
60. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses (London: Dent, 1973).
See also Philip Pettit, “Two Republican Traditions,” in Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law
and Politics, ed. A. Niederbeger and P. Schink (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
forthcoming).
61. Jean-Fabien Spitz, La liberté politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995).
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dom guaranteed by incorporation in collective self-government, that
is what freedom means.
What Berlin missed was that while freedom is to be considered
as a negative ideal, requiring the absence of some evil, there are a
number of different evils in whose absence it might be taken to con-
sist. According to the Hobbesian story, the evil that has to be absent
is frustration. According to Berlin’s own story, it is interference, actual
or counterfactual. And according to the republican story, it is any
form of subjection to the will of another—any form of domination
—whether this be imposed by interference or not. If the argument
of this essay is correct, then Berlin’s concerns about the Hobbesian
view of freedom ought to have led him toward this republican con-
ception, as should his own ideal of the free person. If he failed to
embrace the republican view, that is because he just didn’t recognize
that it was a genuine alternative to the positive conception that he,
quite reasonably, rejected. He thought that the only alternative—or
at least, given his arguments against freedom as nonfrustration, the
only appealing alternative—was the conception of freedom as non-
interference.
In conclusion, a caution. While I think that Berlin ought to have
been moved in the direction of republican theory by his argument
against the Hobbesian view, and by his attachment to the ideal of a
free person, I do not say that he would have been willing to embrace
all the implications of such a position. My own view is that when the
republican ideal of the free person is universalized to all citizens, it
supports a broadly egalitarian program of domestic policy making, a
contestatory image of democracy and an ideal of undominated, well-
ordered peoples in the sphere of international relations.62 I do not
know whether Berlin could have lived with such implications. He had
reason to endorse premises on the basis of which I think they can be
supported, but he might have taken those implications to show that
the premises require revision. My modus ponens might have been his
modus tollens.
62. Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit, “Neo-Republicanism: A Normative and Institutional
Research Program,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 11–29; Philip Pettit, “A
Republican Law of Peoples,” in “Republicanism and International Relations,” ed. Duncan
Bell, special issue, European Journal of Political Theory 9 (2010): 70–94. For a recent artic-
ulation of the republican theory of democracy, see Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
